Behaviorism
International Encyclopedia of the
Social Sciences | 2008 | Copyright
Behaviorism
Behaviorism is a twentieth-century
term, made popular by the psychologist John Watson (1878–1958)
in 1913. Although Watson introduced psychological behaviorism, there is
also a version called philosophical behaviorism.
Psychological behaviorism is the view that psychology should study the behavior of
individual organisms. Psychology should be defined not as the study of the mind
and internal mental processes via introspection, but as the science of
behavior. The most famous proponents of psychological behaviorism were John
Watson and B. F. Skinner (1904–1990). Other notable behaviorists were Edwin Guthrie (1886–1959),
Edward Tolman (1886–1959),
Clark Hull (1884–1952),
and Kenneth Spence (1907–1967).
Philosophical behaviorism, by contrast, is a research program advanced primarily by
philosophers of the twentieth century. This school is much more difficult to
characterize, but in general, it is concerned with the philosophy of mind, the
meaning of mentalistic terms, how we learn this meaning, and how we know when
to use these terms. Important philosophical behaviorists include Bertrand
Russell (1872–1970),
Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976),
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951),
Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970),
Otto Neurath (1882–1945),
Carl Hempel (1905–1997),
and W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000).
Other philosophers such as Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989),
Donald Davidson (1917–2003),
and Richard Rorty (b. 1931) have behavioristic sympathies to varying degrees.
Besides these two generic versions
of behaviorism, there are several subvarieties (see Kitchener 1999; Zuriff
1985). Eliminative behaviorism is the denial that there are any mental
states at all; there is just behavior. Methodological behaviorism is the
view that it does not matter whether there is a mind or not; psychologists
should just study behavior. Logical behaviorism (also called analytic
behaviorism or semantic behaviorism ) is the view that all
mentalistic terms or concepts can be defined or translated into behavioral
terms or concepts. Epistemological behaviorism and evidential
behaviorism hold roughly the view that the only way to know about a mental
state is by observing behavior.
A
BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
It should be noted that in the
intellectual history of western culture there have been individuals who held
views very similar to theories supported by one or both of these movements,
even though they did not use the term behaviorism ; others have
championed views that may not be characterized as “behavioristic,”
but which have had a strong impact on behavioristic ways of thinking (see
Peters 1973–1974;
Harrell and Harrison 1938). The writings of Aristotle (384
bce-322 bce), in particular his De Anima, his account of practical
rationality in the Nicomachean Ethics, and his scientific work on
animals (De Motu Animal ), contain ideas that were assimilated by later
behaviorists. Likewise, the writings of the Stoics and the Skeptics contain
several theoretical accounts that are sympathetic to a general behavioristic
approach, especially their views about animal cognition.
Several seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century works inspired behavioristic followers, including Thomas
Hobbes’s
generally mechanistic account of the mind, The Leviathan (1651), René
Descartes’s
1637 account of animal behavior, Discourse on Method, and the writings
of several individuals who belonged to the French Encyclopedists tradition of
the Enlightenment,
such as Julien de La Mettrie’s Man a Machine (1748), Pierre Cabanis’s
On the Relations between the Physical and the Moral Aspects of Man
(1802), and Baron d’Holbach’s
The System of Nature (1770), among others.
The Cartesian Tradition A major philosophical issue emerging in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries concerned the question of the nature of the human mind and
the animal mind: Is it possible to provide a mechanistic, materialistic, and
deterministic account of the human mind, or must one appeal to principles that
are quite different from those used in modern physics? Descartes argued that
the human mind is made of a substance different from any found in the natural
world, one that operates by principles at odds with the ordinary causal
processes of inorganic matter. Although humans possess this special kind of
spiritual being, animals do not; they are, quite simply, machines that operate
by ordinary “matter
in motion”
(Descartes 1637). Humans are radically different from such animals because the
human mind is made of a quite different substance that is not observable by
ordinary naturalistic methods; however, humans have a kind of special access to
their own minds, found by means of internal reflection or introspection. None
of this was true of animals, all of whose behavior can be explained
mechanistically in terms of simple mechanical principles (see Rosenfeld 1941).
The question that arose, therefore,
was this: If Descartes was correct about his animal psychology, was he also
correct about human psychology? Do we need to appeal to a special nonmaterial
substance to explain the behavior of humans, or can all of their behavior be
explained in the same ways we explain animal behavior? Although Descartes’s
answer was widely accepted, there were a few individuals who argued that humans
are no different from animals, and hence if animal behavior can be explained
along naturalistic lines—by
observing their behavior and trying to explain it by deterministic laws of
matter in motion—the
same is true of humans. This was the view of some eighteenth-century thinkers
who championed a purely naturalistic, materialistic, deterministic, and
mechanistic account of humans. They were the forefathers of mainstream
psychological behaviorism.
The nineteenth century produced
philosophers and scientists who, in one form or another, contributed ideas that
were fuel for the behaviorists’ fire. An example are the post-Kantian German idealistic
philosophers, many of whom stressed the importance of praxis, or human
action. These ideas in turn strongly influenced members of the
philosophical/psychological school of pragmatism, including Charles Sanders
Peirce (1839–1914),
William James (1842–1910),
and John Dewey
(1859–1952).
These pragmatists were concerned with understanding and providing an account of
humans and animals that focused on their action—something that organisms did,
something they tried to accomplish as they interacted in their physical and
social environment. Strongly influenced by the Darwinian revolution, the
pragmatists employed a Darwinian model of organisms adapting to their
environments to understand action. Such an approach at once stressed the
problem-solving nature of human and animal mentality and the assumption that
everything that exists must be understood in a “functional”
way—that
is, how entities such as ideas are useful in an organism’s
struggle to survive in its environment. All intelligence was to be explained in
this way, as an “instrument
of action.”
Although Sigmund Freud
was no behaviorist, he did aid the behaviorist cause by challenging the
reigning Cartesian model of the mind that maintained that humans had an
immediate and privileged access to the inner workings of their minds that
employed a first-person rather than a third-person perspective on the mind, and
that tended to draw a sharp distinction between the human mind and the animal
mind. Freud argued that the mind is not transparent to our internal gaze
because most of our mental activity is going on below the surface at the level
of the unconscious (Freud 1900). If this is correct, then the method of
psychology cannot be assumed to be introspective. This opened the way to
alternative methods of psychological investigation.
The work of Ivan Pavlov on the
conditioned reflexes of dogs ([1927] 1960), as well as the work of other
Russian physiological scientists, provided behaviorists with scientific
accounts of behavior. Behavior occurs, persists, and changes as a result of classical
conditioning : An original stimulus elicits some response; another stimulus
is subsequently paired with the original stimulus, thereby acquiring the power
to elicit the response. This version of S-R psychology is the paradigm for at
least early behaviorism, providing an explanation of behavior. The other kind
of learning employed by behaviorists was instrumental conditioning (operant
conditioning, trial and error learning), first introduced in 1898 by Edward
Thorndike (1874–1949).
In instrumental conditioning, a response is learned because it is reinforced by
a stimulus—the
reward—where
the response is instrumental in obtaining the reward. Classical and
instrumental learning promised to explain all of behavior. None of this seemed
to require private internal workings of a special kind of substance. Psychology
could take its place among the objective natural sciences.
PSYCHOLOGICAL
BEHAVIORISM
In psychology, behaviorism began
with John Watson, who coined the term behaviorism and set forth its
initial premises in his seminal article “Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It”
(1913). Behaviorism, Watson suggested, should be considered an objective,
natural science, one that studies the public, observable behavior of organisms.
Rejecting the method of introspection practiced by his predecessors, Watson
suggested a different method to be used by psychologists: Study the observable
behavior of others, and to explain it, given the stimulus, predict the
response; given the response, predict the stimulus. The aim of psychology,
therefore, was the prediction and control of behavior. What then of the mind,
that special substance that Descartes claimed was the special province of
humans? Watson gave several different answers over the course of his career,
including eliminative behaviorism, methodological behaviorism, and, later, the
view that the mind exists but is the same as behavior. In short, Watson’s
argument was this: Humans and animals are not radically different from each
other, and since the behavior of animals can be explained without appealing to
consciousness, the behavior of humans can be explained without appealing to
consciousness, too. With the rise of the cognitive sciences in the 1960s, this
conclusion was denied, and so was the claim that the behavior of animals can be
explained without appealing to consciousness.
The key question is, what did Watson
mean by “behavior”?
Was it a mechanical physical movement of the body or something more complex—the
intentional, purposive action of a rational agent? If the latter, then how can
a purely mechanistic science account for it? This perplexing question remained
at the center of discussion for decades. Doubts about a mechanistic approach
gave impetus to versions of purposive behaviorism found in the writings
of William McDougall (1912), Edwin Holt (1915), and E. C. Tolman (1932).
Indeed, McDougall and Holt had been proposing a kind of teleological
behaviorism before Watson had appeared on the scene.
We can divide the history of
psychological behaviorism into several periods: (1) classical behaviorism, (2)
neobehaviorism, (3) operant behaviorism, and (4) contemporary behaviorism. The
first period (1912–1930)
introduced the theory of behaviorism championed by John Watson and several
other early advocates of behaviorism, including Max Meyer, Albert Weiss, Walter
Hunter, and Karl Lashley. These behavioristic accounts were, by and large,
naive, sketchy, and inadequate, but they set forth the general program of
psychological behaviorism.
The second period (1930–1950)
was the era of neobehaviorism, so called because its philosophical
underpinnings were somewhat different from its predecessors. Neobehaviorism was
wedded to classical learning theory (see Koch 1959), and neobehaviorists were
concerned with what form an adequate theory of learning should take. The main
figures were Edwin Guthrie, Edward Tolman, Clark Hull, B. F. Skinner, and
Kenneth Spence. All of these individuals spent a great deal of time laying out
the philosophical bases of their respective kinds of behaviorism, and in doing
so, they borrowed heavily from the school of logical positivism, which was
influential at the time (but see Smith 1986). This resulted in an emphasis on
the importance of operational definitions, a preference for a
hypothetico-deductive model of theory construction, and a focus on issues about
intervening variables versus hypothetical constructs, and the admissibility of
neurological speculation. This move toward postulating internal mediating
responses continued with later Hullian neobehaviorists such as Charles Osgood,
Neal Miller, O. H. Mowrer, Frank Logan, and others.
The last two phases of behaviorism
are more difficult to characterize. Skinner’s version of behaviorism—operant behaviorism—is markedly different from most of the other
neobehaviorists, and yet he is perhaps the best-known behaviorist. Indeed,
after the demise of Hullian learning theory in the 1960s, the main thrust of
the movement switched to Skinner’s distinctive version of behaviorism.
Denying he was an S-R psychologist,
Skinner championed an operant account of learning, in which a response that
occurs is reinforced and its frequency is increased (1938). The response—for
example, a bar press or a key peck—is not elicited by any known stimulus, but once it has
occurred, its rate of response can be changed by various kinds of reinforcement
schedules. The response can also be brought under experimental control when it
occurs in the presence of a discriminative stimulus (e.g., light). Such a relationship—discriminative
stimulus, response, reinforcement—is sometimes called a contingency of reinforcement, and it
holds a central place in Skinner’s brand of behaviorism. Skinner himself characterized his
behaviorism as a “radical
behaviorism”
because rather than ignoring what is going on inside the organism, it insists
that such events are still behavior (1974). However, such behavior still is
caused by environmental variables.
Skinnerian behaviorism was the
dominant version of behaviorism in the 1970s, and Skinner extended his approach
to consider more and more complex behavior, including thought processes and
language. His 1957 book Verbal Behavior, an example of this
extrapolation, was reviewed by the linguist Noam Chomsky, who subjected it to
devastating criticism (Chomsky 1959). Skinner declined to respond to Chomsky,
and many individuals took this as a sign of the demise of behaviorism. This was
not completely true, as can be seen in the current era of behaviorism, which
features teleological behaviorism, interbehaviorism, empirical behaviorism, and
so on (see O’Donohue
and Kitchener 1999). Although behaviorism does not have the hegemony it once
did, it continues to exist, but is restricted to pockets of research. Indeed,
there are several scientific journals devoted to behaviorism, including the Experimental
Analysis of Behavior and Behavior and Philosophy.
Philosophical Behaviorism Although psychological behaviorism can be described
relatively clearly, philosophical behaviorism cannot. Fundamentally, a
philosophical behaviorist is one who has a particular theory of the
philosophical nature of the mind. All philosophical behaviorists are opposed to
the Cartesian theory of mind: that the mind is a special kind of nonphysical
substance that is essentially private, and introspection is the only or primary
way of knowing about the contents of the mind, such that the individual has a
privileged access to his mind. One or more of these tenets is denied by the
philosophical behaviorist, who believes that there is nothing necessarily
hidden about the mind: It is not essentially private, not made of a special
substance, not known by any special method, and there is no privileged access
to the mind.
In effect, the philosophical
behaviorist claims that the mind is essentially something public, exemplified
in one’s
actions in the world, and that mentalistic properties are those displayed in
certain kinds of public behavior. Such a view was championed by Bertrand
Russell (1921, 1927; see Kitchener 2004). But what particularly distinguishes
twentieth-century philosophical behaviorism is its commitment to semantic
behaviorism, the view that philosophy is concerned with the analysis of the
meaning of mentalistic terms, concepts, and representations. This “linguistic
turn”
in philosophy (Rorty 1967) means that instead of talking about the nature of
the mind as an object in the world, philosophers should be concerned with our
linguistic representations of the mind. This type of philosophical behaviorism
is called logical (analytic, conceptual) behaviorism. Philosophical
behaviorism, therefore, is different from psychological behaviorism.
Ludwig Wittgenstein is sometimes
called a behaviorist, largely because he was critical of the Cartesian model of
the mind, especially its assumption that the meaning of a mentalistic term must
be given in terms of one’s
private sensations or states of consciousness. Such an account would amount to
a private language because only the individual can know the meaning of a
mentalistic term, an item of his necessarily private experience. Private
languages are not possible according to Wittgenstein, because any language must
(initially) be a public language; the meaning of mentalistic terms must be
intersubjective and public (1953). In order to use a word correctly,
Wittgenstein claimed, there must be public criteria for its correct employment.
Most individuals insist that Wittgenstein’s kind of behaviorism is radically different from the
psychological behaviorism of Watson and Hull. Whether it is fundamentally
different from Skinner’s
behaviorism is still an open question.
Gilbert Ryle is also sometimes
characterized as an analytic or logical behaviorist. Also rejecting the
Cartesian conception of the mind, Ryle showed that mentalistic terms have to
have public criteria for their correct use, and hence that mentalistic terms
and states are not essentially private to the individual, but must be
understood (largely) as complex behavioral dispositions, or actions (and
tendencies to act) in certain kinds of physical and social situations (1949).
According to Ryle, therefore, mentalistic terms are to be understood in the
same way we understand the meaning of, for example, the term punctual :
An individual is punctual if she shows up to class on time, regularly meets her
appointments, and so on. Ryle had strong reservations about calling his views “behavioristic,”
largely because he thought behaviorism was committed to a mechanistic account
of bodily movements and this was certainly not what behavior (or better,
action) was.
As Ryle was influenced by
Wittgenstein, so were other philosophical behaviorists. Rudolf Carnap and Carl
Hempel were members of the group of philosophers known as logical positivists.
According to a fundamental principle of logical positivism, the meaning of a
statement consists of its method of verification. The meaning of a mentalistic
term must be verifiable to be meaningful, and in principle, its meaning
consists in how one verifies it by means of empirical observation. For example,
the statement “Paul
has a toothache”
is (approximately) equivalent in meaning to the procedures one uses to verify
that Paul has a toothache. Although this might consist in observing Paul’s
physical behavior, it might also consist in observing the state of Paul’s
tooth. Hence, for logical positivists, analytic behaviorism merged into the
identity theory of mind and central state materialism—the
view that mental states are central states of the brain. It remains unclear,
therefore, to what extent they should be called “logical behaviorists”;
certainly their version of logical behaviorism was quite different from
Wittgenstein’s
and Ryle’s.
The last notable philosophical
behaviorist was Willard Quine, who was strongly influenced by Carnap (and
Wittgenstein); nevertheless, his views are not easily assimilated with theirs.
His views about meaning (and hence the meaning of mentalistic terms) were
verificationist in spirit (because he was an epistemological behaviorist), but
he did not share certain of Carnap’s views about how to give a behavioral translation of mental
terms. It cannot be done atomistically, but only holistically: One cannot give
the meaning of single mentalistic term by giving observational conditions for
its use. Indeed, Quine was suspicious of the very notion of “meaning”
because such things, if they do exist, would be difficult to reconcile with
naturalism and physicalism, and therefore the meaning of a mentalistic term
cannot be equivalent to some item of behavior. Quine was also skeptical of the
very possibility of verifying a statement by means of a set of observations;
scientific observation is a much more theoretical affair than this.
Nevertheless, Quine insisted that any science is committed to the observation
of behavior (epistemological behaviorism, evidential behaviorism), and hence
that mentalistic terms are, in some sense, equivalent to behavior. This is, in
part, due to the public nature of language (Quine 1960). We obviously do learn
what words mean in the process of learning a language, but all of this occurs
in the public arena. We are taught how to use words by our linguistic
community: In the presence of a public object such as snow, we learn (by
principles such as those indicated by Skinner) to utter the word snow.
Hence, Quine’s
behaviorism is sometimes called a linguistic behaviorism because he
insisted that all we have to go on when we teach and learn a language is the
public behavior of individuals. This is closely tied to the importance of
empirical observation and verification. Furthermore, Quine was committed to semantic
behaviorism, the view that the meaning of words is necessarily tied to (or
consists of) public behavior. Meanings are, therefore, not “in
the mind.”
This is a close cousin to the logical behaviorism of earlier philosophers.
With the rise of computer science
and artificial intelligence in the 1960s, an interesting question arose
concerning how one could decide if a machine such as a computer was intelligent
or not (i.e., whether it “had
a mind”).
Alan Turing proposed a test—the “Turing
test”—for
deciding this question (Turing 1950). Basically, the Turing test holds that if
you cannot distinguish a computer from a human in terms of its behavior, for
example by asking them both questions and reading their answers, then because
the human is intelligent, it would be difficult to deny that the machine is
intelligent too.
The Turing test raises the issue of
behaviorism once more, this time in the context of computers: Is it the actual
behavior of the computer that is decisive in ascribing intelligence to it, or
are the internal workings of the computer (e.g., using a lookup table)
important? Those who answer yes to the latter question might be considered
mentalists rather than behaviorists (Block 1981). There is reason to believe
that Turing himself thought the internal processing of the computer were
important, something most behaviorists have never really denied.
OBJECTIONS
TO BEHAVIORISM
Psychological behaviorism and
philosophical behaviorism have been criticized since the beginning of the
twentieth century.
Objection: Behaviorism Ignores or
Denies Consciousness Critics charge that because the
behaviorist focuses on behavior—and this means external behavior—he
or she ignores or dismisses the private internal realm of consciousness.
Let us assume that consciousness
does exist, that individuals are aware of their internal mental thoughts and
sensations. The methodological behaviorist argues that this realm can be
ignored (from a scientific point of view) by simply refusing to consider it.
Radical behaviorists argue that behaviorism does not have to ignore this realm;
instead, one can simply treat consciousness as internal behavior not unlike the
behavior of one’s
stomach when it digests food. Or, a behaviorist might reply that consciousness
is not actual occurrent internal behavior, but rather a behavioral disposition.
This is what we ordinarily mean when we say things such as, for example, “the
cat is awake and thinking about the mouse.”
One property of consciousness that
it is particularly difficult for the behaviorist to accommodate are qualia
—the
internal “feel”
of certain mental states or events, like the taste of chocolate or the feeling
of a sharp pain. A related problem is how a behaviorist can handle images, for
example, the image I have of my morning breakfast.
Objection: Behaviorist Explanations
Are Inadequate Most behaviorists take behavior as
that which needs to be explained—why it occurs, what its form consists of, why it ceases, and
so on. But what provides the explanation of such behavior? The standard answer
is that stimuli—external
stimuli—provide
explanations, together with psychological principles concerning the relation of
such stimuli to responses. But according to the critic, it remains doubtful
that external stimuli can provide such all-encompassing explanations. Instead,
one must refer to certain kinds of internal states—typically
cognitive states—to
explain the behavior.
A very sketchy behaviorist reply
would be that all explanatory internal states—including all “cognitive”
states—can
be explained in terms of the ordinary concepts of stimulus and response, as
long as these terms are suitably modified. This typically has taken the form of
saying that there are internal states occurring between the external stimulus
and the external response but that these internal states are understood to be
internal stimuli and internal responses; for example, according to Hull,
internal states might be fractional anticipatory goal responses together with
sensory feedback from them. These internal mediating mechanisms are not popular
by contemporary cognitive standards, but if behaviorism is to be a viable
research program, it must clearly postulate such an internal mechanism or
something analogous. Whether these behavioristic models are sufficiently
cognitive or representational remains an open question.
Objection: The Behaviorist Concept
of Behavior Is Inadequate
According to one popular argument (Hamlyn 1953), the behaviorist sees ordinary
behavior as a mechanistic, physical response, like the movement of an arm. But
this is an inadequate conception of human behavior, which is better thought of
as an action, such as waving, signaling, flirting, or gesturing. The
behaviorist cannot handle this kind of conception because actions are not
mechanistic but rather intentional, teleological, rule-governed, governed by
social norms, and so on, and these are incompatible with the behavioristic
program.
The standard behaviorist reply is to
deny the distinction between movements and actions and/or to argue that the
behaviorist has always been interested in actions (Kitchener 1977), and that
such a concept is consistent with a causal account.
Objection: The Behaviorist Cannot
Adequately “Analyze” or Define a Single Mentalistic Term by Means of a Set of
Behaviors Logical behaviorists attempted to
translate a mentalistic term such as belief into a corresponding set of
behaviors, for example, a verbal response. But such a translation is only
plausible if we assume other mental states in our account, for example, other
beliefs, desires, and so on. Hence we have not gotten rid of mentalistic terms
(Chisholm 1957; Geach 1957) because there is no term-by-term reduction or
elimination.
This objection carries little weight
because logical behaviorists such as Carnap and Hempel very early in their
careers gave up such a term-by-term approach in favor of a more holistic,
theoretical approach, and this commands a central place in Quine’s
holistic behaviorism.
Objection: The Spartan Objection and
the Dramaturgical Objection A mental
state, such as pain, is not equivalent to a set of public behaviors because it
is possible for one to be stoic about pain: I might be in intense pain but
never show it because, say, it is not “macho”
to show pain. Likewise, I might manifest pain behavior but not really be in
pain, as when I simulate pain as an actor in a play. Hence pain behavior is
neither sufficient nor necessary for being in pain (Putnam 1975).
Both of these objections assume a
very naive, “peripheral”
behaviorism in which the behavior in question is publicly observable. It is
necessarily restrictive because behaviorists can hold more sophisticated forms
involving “internal”
(covert) behavior along with the inclusion of behavioral “dispositions.”
Secondly, the behaviorist has insisted that one learns the meaning of the term pain
and to use the word correctly only in the context of public behavior, a view
shared by Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Sellars, and Skinner. There must be
public criteria for the correct use of pain. So originally a certain
kind of behaviorism must be correct; later, we may learn how to suppress such
behavior and to internalize it. The basis of this claim concerns the learning
of language and is based on Wittgenstein’s arguments against a private language, or on arguments
similar to his.
CONCLUSION
Few individuals would claim that
behaviorism today enjoys the popularity it once had. Indeed, many (or most)
argue that behaviorism is dead—both in psychology and in philosophy. The claim is easier to
make with respect to psychology, particularly in the aftermath of the cognitive
revolution. Nevertheless, the reports of the death of behaviorism are somewhat
exaggerated. Not only are there viable and interesting research programs that
are behavioristic in name, there are signs that even in cognitive science and
cognitive psychology there is a reemergence of behaviorism, for example, in connectionism
(neural nets), robotics, and dynamic systems theory. In fact, according to
some, it remains unclear how cognitive psychology differs from behaviorism,
since most behaviorists have also been concerned with central cognitive states.
Still, psychological behaviorism is currently a minor opinion.
In philosophy the matter is somewhat
different. This is because of the centrality of language learning in analytic
philosophy, which seems to demand something like a rule-following conception
that presupposes a public or social conception of behavior. This view is shared
by those sympathetic to Ryle, Wittgenstein, or Quine. The logical behaviorism
of Carnap and Hempel is passé because it was abandoned early in favor of a central state
theory of mind. But although psychological behaviorism may have seen its day,
philosophical behavior, in one form or another, still claims the strong
allegiance of many philosophers (depending on how one characterizes behaviorism
).
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Richard F. Kitchener
